En Cogito and the Unconscious (Duke University Press, 1998)
What if references to the Freudian subject are not external to philosophy but can in fact tell us something about the modern Cartesian subject?
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What if psychoanalysis renders visible something that the modern philosophy of subjectivity accomplishes without knowing it, its own grounding gesture, which philosophy has to disavow if it is to assume its place within academic knowledge?
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This is what Lacan was doing all the time: reading hysteria or obsessional neurosis as a philosophical “attitude of thought towards reality” (the obsessional compulsion to think-“if I stop thinking I will cease to exist”-as the truth of the Cartesian cogito ergo sum).
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The whole of modern philosophy, from Descartes onward, involves an inherent reference to the threat of madness, and is thus a desperate attempt to draw a clear line that separates the transcendental philosopher from the madman.
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Modern subjectivity emerges when the subject perceives himself as “out of joint”, as excluded from the “order of things” from the positive order of entities.
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The very idea of the universe, of the all of reality, as a totality that exists in itself, is thus rejected as a paralogism: what appears as an epistemological limitation of our capacity to grasp reality (the fact that we are forever perceiving reality from our finite, temporal standpoint) is the positive ontological condition of reality itself.
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This excess of madness against which modern philosophy fights is the very founding gesture of Cartesian subjectivity.
*Shiboleth- cliche, accent, jargon
alla donde no pienso existo. o sea q es tamos un poco vivos si estamos un poco locos.
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